Abstract-This paper studies the use of multi-antenna harvestand-jam (HJ) helpers in a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay wiretap channel assuming that the direct link between the source and destination is broken. Our objective is to maximize the secrecy rate at the destination subject to the transmit power constraints of the AF relay and the HJ helpers. In the case of perfect channel state information (CSI), the joint optimization of the artificial noise (AN) covariance matrix for jamming and the AF beamforming matrix is studied using semi-definite relaxation (SDR) which is tight, while suboptimal solutions are also devised with lower complexity. For the imperfect CSI case, we provide the equivalent reformulation of the worst-case robust optimization to maximize the minimum achievable secrecy rate. Inspired by the optimal solution to the case of perfect CSI, a suboptimal robust scheme is proposed striking a good tradeoff between complexity and performance. Finally, numerical results for various settings are provided to evaluate the proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pressing demand for high data rate in wireless communications networks coupled with the fact that mobile devices are physically small and power-limited by batteries, has driven the notion of energy harvesting (EH) to become a promising resolution for green communications [1, 2] . Among the varied available resources for EH, radio-frequency (RF)-enabled wireless energy transfer (WET) has aroused an upsurge of interest for its long operation range, ubiquitous existence in the electromagnetic radiation, and effective energy multicasting, which motivates the paradigm of simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT), e.g., [3] [4] [5] [6] .
A typical SWIPT system consists of one access point (AP) that has constant power supply and broadcasts wireless signals to a group of user terminals, amongst which some intend to decode information, referred to as information receivers (IRs), while others scavenge energy from the ambient radio signals, named energy receivers (ERs). This gives rise to a challenging physical (PHY)-layer security issue where the ERs may eavesdrop the information sent to the IRs due to their close proximity to the AP for operating with EH-enabled receiving power. To overcome this problem, in [7] [8] [9] , several researchers Part of this paper has been presented at the IEEE Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), Austin, TX, USA, Dec. 8-12, 2014. H. Xing and A. Nallanathan are with the Centre for Telecommunications Research, King's College London (e-mails: hong.xing@kcl.ac.uk; arumugam.nallanathan@kcl.ac.uk).
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presented various approaches to achieve secret communication to the IRs and maximize the energy simultaneously transferred to the ERs or to satisfy the individual EH requirement for the ERs and maximize the secrecy rate for the IR, by advocating the dual use of the artificial noise (AN) or jamming.
However, previous works all assumed that the ERs in the SWIPT systems attempt to intercept the information for the IR, which is overly protective. On the contrary, it is possible that some ERs are cooperative, especially when they are EHenabled wirelessly. Following the recent advances in wireless powered communications networks [10, 11] , this paper proposes a self-sustaining harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol, where in the first transmission phase a single-antenna transmitter transfers confidential information to a multiple-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) relay and power to a group of multiantenna EH-enabled idle helpers simultaneously, while in the second phase, the relay amplifies and forwards the information to the IR under the protection of the AN generated by the helpers using the energy harvested from their received signals in the first transmission phase.
Physical (PHY)-layer security issues in the rapidly growing cooperative networks have attracted much attention. Cooperative approaches, such as, cooperative jamming, for providing secrecy communications have been widely examined [12] [13] [14] [15] . The idea is to assist the transmitter in the secrecy transmission by generating an AN to interfere with the eavesdropper by either multiple antennas or external trusted helpers [16] [17] [18] [19] . However, all of those utilizing ANs require additional supply of power and therefore incur extra system costs. Meanwhile, collaborative use of relays to form effective beams jamming the eavesdropper, i.e., secure collaborative relay beamforming, has been studied for relay-wiretap channels with single eavesdropper in [20] , multiple eavesdroppers (with AF relays) in [21] , and multiple eavesdroppers (with decode-and-forward (DF) relays) in [22] . All, however, assumed the availability of perfect channel state information (CSI). Though [23] proposed robust AF relay beamforming against the eavesdropper's channel, the solutions are suboptimal and very much rely on accurate CSI of the relay-to-legitimate receiver channel.
The assumption of perfect CSI of the eavesdroppers appears to be too ideal because the eavesdroppers, despite being legitimate users, wish to hide from the transmitter without being cooperative in the stage of channel estimation. Even if they are registered users and bound to help the transmitter in obtaining their CSIs to facilitate their own communication, the CSIs at the transmitter side will change due to mobility and Doppler effect, and will be outdated. Moreover, even for the legitimate users, the estimated CSIs may also be subject to quantization errors due to the limited capacity of the feedback channel, although the inaccuracy is reasonably assumed less severe than that for the eavesdroppers. To tackle this issue, state-of-art schemes have been developed ([24] and the references therein), among which the worst-case secrecy rate is commonly employed to formulate the robust secrecy rate maximization problem [8, 19, [25] [26] [27] . The robust transmit covariance design for the worst-case secrecy rate maximization in a multiple-input-single-output (MISO) channel overheard by multi-antenna eavesdroppers was considered in [25] while the enhanced secrecy performance was achieved by introducing a friendly jammer in the same scenario in [26] , in which a joint optimization of the robust transmit covariance and power allocation between the source and the helper was studied via geometric programming. More recently, [8] studied a joint robust design of the information beams, the AN and the energy signals for SWIPT networks with quality-of-service (QoS) constraints.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, with perfect CSI, in addition to the joint optimal solutions, we propose two near-optimal schemes with much reduced complexity by exploiting the optimal structure of the relay weight matrix, and providing a semi-closed form solution for the relay weight matrix given fixed null-space jamming, respectively. Second, besides the imperfect eavesdropper's channel, legitimate channels such as those from the K HJ helpers (the transmitter) to the legitimate receiver (K HJ helpers), and from the AF relay to the receiver are jointly modeled with imperfect estimation, and multiple semi-indefinite non-convex constraints have been judiciously replaced by linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) to fit the semi-definite programming (SDP). Third, rank-one reconstruction algorithms exploiting the structure of the semidefinite relaxation (SDR)-based solutions have been proposed to provide promising performance at low computational cost.
Of particular relevance to our work is [28] which jointly optimizes the AF matrices and AN covariances in a relay wiretap channel with multiple multi-antenna AF relays and multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers via a worst-case robust formulation. While our network model is similar, the difference of our work from [28] is twofold. On one hand, in this paper, the AN generated by the friendly jammers are also constrained by their respective channels from the transmitter during WET in the first transmission phase. On the other hand, the technique in [28, Proposition 1 ] cannot be applied to our problem since the AN beams and the forwarded information are transmitted via different channels in ours. As a consequence, to the best of authors' knowledge, our proposed worst-case based robust optimization scheme that incorporates imperfect CSIs into all the HJ helpers, has not been addressed in the literature.
It is worth noting that devising a wireless-powered friendly jammer to enhance PHY-layer security for a direct transmission protocol was studied in [29] , in which the "harvesting" blocks and "jamming" blocks were well exploited to compose four different types of harvesting-jamming cycles. Compared to [29] , which focused on the dedicated scheduling of "harvest" and "jam" operations and its long-term performance, ours are concerned with adaptive rate/power optimization with multiple HJ helpers to achieve higher worst-case secrecy rate. Moreover, instead of assuming perfect channels to/from the HJ helpers, our robust optimization algorithm takes imperfect legitimate channels into account to provide robustness.
Note that in this paper, as in [23, 28] , we assume that the channel between the transmitter and the AF relay is perfectly known and there is no direct link between the transmitter and the receiver or the eavesdropper, a common assumption in the concerned AF relay wiretap channel [20, 21] .
Notations-Throughout, we use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. The superscripts (·)
T , (·) † and (·) H represent the transpose, conjugate and conjugate transpose, respectively. Also, tr(·) and E[·] stand for the trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation for random variables, respectively. Likewise, vec(A) is defined as a column vector obtained by stacking the rows of A on top of one another. vec (−1) is the inverse operation of vec. null(A) denotes the null space of A. ⊗ represents the Kronecker product of two matrices. In addition, the notation A 0 indicates that A is a positive semi-definite matrix and I (0) denotes an identity (all-zero) matrix with appropriate size. Furthermore, · represents the Euclidean norm of a vector, while P r (·) stands for the probability of an input random event. Finally, [x] + denotes max(0, x) and (·) * stands for an optimal solution.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider a cooperative relay wiretap channel for SWIPT over a given frequency band as shown in Fig. 1(a) . We assume that there is a transmitter, named Alice, sending confidential messages to the IR, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper [30] , Eve, with the aid of a multi-antenna AF relay and K ERs willing to act as HJ helpers, H helper = {H 1 , . . . , H K }. The transmitter, ERs, and the AF relay are deployed in a same cluster that is relatively far away from the destination and Eve, such that there is no direct link from the transmitter to the receiver or Eve, respectively. Moreover, the ERs are assumed to be located closer to the transmitter than the AF relay in order that they can harvest sufficient amount of energy for jamming. Alice, Bob and Eve are all assumed to be equipped with single antenna, while the AF relay and each of the K helpers are assumed to have the same N t antennas.
Using two equal slots for the HJ relaying protocol, as shown in Fig. 1(b) , for the first phase, Alice sends a confidential message to the relay while simultaneously transferring energy to the K helpers; for the second phase, the relay amplifies and forwards the message to Bob while the K helpers perform cooperative jamming using their respective harvested energy from the first transmission phase, to compromise Eve. In this paper, we assume a quasi-static fading environment and for convenience denote h 0 ∈ C Nt×1 as the complex channel from the transmitter to the relay and h k ∈ C Nt×1 , k = 1, . . . , K, as that from the transmitter to the kth helper;h 0 as the transpose of the complex channel from the relay to Bob andh k ∈ C Nt×1 , k = 1, . . . , K, as that from H k to Bob; g 0 ∈ C Nt×1 and g k ∈ C Nt×1 , k = 1, . . . , K, as those from the relay and H k to Eve, respectively. In the first transmission phase, the baseband received signal at the AF relay can be expressed as
where s is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable, denoted by s ∼ CN (0, 1) and n r is the additive complex noise vector, denoted by n r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 r I). Also, P s denotes the given transmit power at Alice. Further, the received signal at each helper H k is expressed as
where n ′ k is the additive noise, denoted by n
On the other hand, for WET, the harvested energyof H k in each unit slot is given by
where 0 < η ≤ 1 denotes the EH efficiency. In the second transmission phase, the linear operation at the AF relay can be represented by
where x ′ ∈ C Nt×1 is the retransmit signal at the AF relay and W ∈ C Nt×Nt is the beamforming matrix. Note that the transmit power of the AF relay can be shown as
which is constrained by the maximum available power at the AF relay, i.e., P r , which is given by
In the meantime, each H k will help generate an AN n k ∈ C Nt×1 to interfere with Eve. Similar to [16] , we assume that n k 's are independent CSCG vectors denoted by n k ∼ CN (0, Q k ), ∀k, since the worst-case noise for Eve is known to be Gaussian. In addition, each H k has a transmit power constraint due to its harvested energy in the previous transmission phase, i.e., tr(Q k ) ≤ ηP s h k 2 (c.f. (3)), ∀k. The received signal at Bob can thus be expressed as
where n b ∼ CN (0, σ 2 b I) is the additive noise at Bob. Similarly, the received signal at Eve can be expressed as (8) where n e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e I). According to (7) and (8), the signalto-interference-plus-nose-ratio (SINR) at Bob and Eve can be, respectively, expressed as
and
As such, the achievable secrecy rate at Bob is [16] 
III. JOINT AN-AF BEAMFORMING WITH PERFECT CSI
A. Problem Formulation for Perfect CSI
We aim to maximize the secrecy rate at Bob subject to the transmit power constraints at the AF relay and each individual helper H k , k = 1, . . . , K. Thus, our problem is to solve
Next, we define a new functionF ({Q k }, W ) as
It can be easily shown that the optimal solution {Q * k }, W * to (P1), is also optimal for (P1 ′ ) given by
Hence, we focus on solving problem (P1 ′ ) in the rest of the paper. However, since (P1 ′ ) is in general a non-convex problem that is hard to solve, we will reformulate it into a two-stage optimization problem. First, we constrain the SINR at Eve to beγ e , it thus follows from (13) 
is maximized when γ b is maximized, which can be obtained by solving the following problem: 
B. Optimal Solution to (P1
Here, we consider solving problem (P1 ′ .1) by jointly optimizing the covariance matrix for the AN at each of the HJ helper, Q k 's, and the beamforming matrix, W . To facilitate the analysis in the sequel, we rewrite the following equations in line with our definition of vec(·) [31, Chapter 13]:
In addition,
Then by ignoring the rank-one
Problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv), via Charnes-Cooper transformation [32] , can be equivalently recast as
(23e)
Lemma 3.2:
The constraints in (23a) and (23b) can be replaced by σ
respectively, where both inequalities will be activated when problem (P1 ′ ) obtains its optimum value.
is a standard convex optimization problem and satisfies the Slater's condition, its gap with its dual problem is zero [34] . Now, let λ denote the dual variable associated with the equality constraint in (23a), α associated with the other equality constraint in (23b), β 0 associated with the transmit power constraint for the AF relay in (23c), {β k } associated with the transmit power constraints for each H k in (23d), and ζ associated with τ . Then the Lagrangian of problem (P1
where Ω denotes the set of all primal and dual variables,
satisfies the following conditions:
2) X * can be expressed as
where a n ≥ 0 ∀n, b > 0, r c = rank(C * ) (c.f. (88)) and
, which is constituted of orthonormal basis for null(C * ); 3) According to (28) , if rank(X * ) > 1, then we have the following sufficient condition to yield an optimal solution of X with rank-one:
is also optimal to problem (P1
Proof: See Appendix A. Note from Proposition 3.1 that if rank(X * ) = 1, then the optimal w * to (P1 ′ .1-RW) can be found directly from the eigenvalue decomposition (EVD) of X * , where X * = X * /τ * . Namely, the upper-bound optimum value obtained by solving (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) is tight in this case; otherwise, (X * , {Q * k }, τ * ) only serves as an upper-bound solution. Now, we show that this upper-bound is always achievable by a rank-one X. When rank(X * ) > 1, firstly, we check whether the sufficient condition proposed in (32) is satisfied. If it is met, then a direct reconstruction of (X * , {Q * k },τ * ) with rank(X * ) = 1 follows according to (29) - (31); otherwise, assume that any optimal solution to problem (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) has no zero component, i.e., (X * = 0, {Q * k = 0}, τ * = 0). In addition, the number of optimization variables and the number of shaping constraints are denoted by L and M , respectively.
has an optimal solution ofX * that is rank-one. Also, the detailed rank reduction procedure based on an arbitrary-rank solution has been given in [35 • Initializeγ e search = 0 : α :γe max and i = 0 (29)- (31) and set w * = √ bξ; else constructX * using the procedure in [35, Algorithm 1] .
The optimal relay beamforming matrix W for problem (P1 ′ .1) is of the form:
where B ∈ C 2×2 and C ∈ C 2×(Nt−2) are two unknown matrices, and
respectively. Since C has 2(N t − 2) complex variables, we devise a suboptimal design for C to reduce the size of variables by
where
The suboptimal design for problem (P1 ′ .1) by ignoring the rank constraints on Z and V is thus given by
, are of much reduced size. Further, the reconstruction of v * from V can be briefly explained as follows. Given the Lagrangian of (P1 ′ .1-sub1-SDR), the KKT conditions with respect to (w.r.t.) V * are given by
Post-multiplying (37) with V * , we have (α * γ e |ḡ
is an arbitrary vector with unit norm. With V solved, (P1 ′ .1-sub1-SDR) reduces to a problem with similar structure as (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR), and the proof for existence of a rank-one Z can be referred to Proposition 3.1.
2) Zero-forcing: We propose a low-complexity ZF scheme for (P1 ′ .1), in which the jamming signal places a null at the IR, and then a semi-closed form solution for W is derived. In line with the principle of ZF jamming [17] , the jamming
Thus, given any W ,ñ k 's can be optimized to maximize the effect of jamming at Eve by max
which is denoted by q.
With fixed q, (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) can be recast as
(39d) Proposition 3.2: (P1 ′ .1-sub2-SDR) must yield a rank-one solution, i.e., X * = ww * , such that w * = µν max (Z * ), and
where ν max (·) represents the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the associated matrix, and µ =
. Also, λ * , α * and β * 0 are the optimal dual variables associated with (39a)-(39c), respectively.
Proof: See Appendix C. The only problem in Proposition 3.2 is the dual problem of (P1 ′ .1-sub2-SDR), which admits a much simpler structure to solve than the primal one.
IV. JOINT AN-AF BEAMFORMING WITH IMPERFECT CSI

A. Problem Formulation for Imperfect CSI
We use a deterministic spherical model [25, 26] to characterize the resulting CSIs' uncertainties such that Accordingly, we denote the robust counterpart for (P1 ′ ) as
An equivalent robust reformulation of (P1 ′ .2) is given by
whereF (γ e ) = γ e andĤ(γ e ) denotes the optimal value of problem (P2 ′ .1) that is given by
As stated in Lemma 3.1, similarly, (P2 ′ ) can be proved to have the same optimal value as (P2 ′ .2) and the same optimal solution as (P2 ′ .1) whenγ e takes its optimal value. As a result, (P2 ′ ) can be solved in a two-stage fashion as well. Specifically, given anyγ e , we first solve (P2 ′ .1) to obtain H(γ e ) and then search for the optimalγ e to (P2 ′ .2).
B. Solutions to (P2
It is worth noting that due to the enlarged feasible region of (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) in contrast with (P2 ′ .1), solution provided by (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) in general yields an upperbound forĤ(γ e ), which may not be achievable. However, in the sequel we insist on solving (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) that is regarded as an upper-bound benchmark for our proposed problem detailed later in this subsection.
1) Solutions to (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv): To make the "maxmin" objective function of (45) tractable, we first rewrite (45) by the equivalent epigraph formulation as
As there are potentially infinite number of constraints in (46a), (44a), and (44c), they are semi-indefinite and thus intractable.
In the following, we equivalently transform these constraints to tractable ones using S-Procedure and a generalized SProcedure given in Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Lemma 4.1 (S-Procedure [34] ): Let f m (x), m = 1, 2 be defined as
and c m ∈ R, and ℜ gives the real part of the input entity. Then the implication f 1 (x) ≥ 0 ⇒ f 2 (x) ≥ 0 holds if and only if there exists δ ≥ 0 such that
provided there exists a pointx such that f m (x) > 0, m = 1, 2.
Lemma 4.2: ([37, Theorem 3.5]):
The robust block quadratic matrix inequality (QMI),
is equivalent to
(50) First, by rearranging terms, (46a) can be equivalently transformed into the following linear form:
Recalling the following matrix equalities in line with our definition of vec(·) operation:
it follows that
whereh ∈ C 
Hence, according to Lemma 4.1, the implication ∆h 2 ≤ N t ǫ ′ 0 ⇒ (57) holds if and only if there exists w (0) ≥ 0 such that the following LMI holds:
. Now, (46a) has been equivalently reformulated as (58). To further cope with channel uncertainties with regards toh k 's such that (58) holds for h k ∈H k , ∀k, we need the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1: The semi-indefinite constraint of (57) can be equivalently recast as the following block matrix inequality:
are recursively given by
and c
. . , K, and {w (k) } denote pertinent auxiliary variables.
Proof: See Appendix D. Next, (44a) is rewritten as
where g = vec(g T 0 ⊗ I) and the equivalent imperfect channel model is given by g =ĝ + ∆g such that ∆g 2 ≤ N t ǫ 0 .
Proposition 4.2:
The semi-indefinite constraint of (62) is satisfied if and only if there exists v (k) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K such that the following block matrix inequality holds:
Proof: See Appendix E. Last, we rewrite (44c) to facilitate the robust optimization against the errors introduced by ∆h k . By applying Lemma 4.1, (44c) holds if and only if there exists µ k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K, such that the following LMI constraint is met:
As such, (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) is now simplified as (63), (67), (44b), (44e).
Because of the non-convex term such as δX ′ in (59), problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv) remains very hard to solve. We thus use the bisection method [34] to solve it. However, using bisection in addition to solving (P2 ′ .2) by one-dimension search overγ e may lead to very high complexity. As a result, we propose an alternative problem to approximateĤ(γ e ).
2) Solutions to (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR): We propose to approximateĤ(γ e ) by the optimum value of the following problem.
≤γ e , (68c)
Remark 4.1: It is worth noting that as the numerator and the denominator of the objective function in (P2 ′ .1) are coupled by common uncertaintyh 0 , Charnes-Cooper transformation, in general, cannot be applied to realize equivalent decoupling. As a result, (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) yields a more conservative approximation forĤ(γ e ) than (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv). However, considering that (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) needs to be solved only once for givenγ e , we exploit it in the sequel. The effectiveness of this approximation will be evaluated in Section V-B.
To proceed, we rewrite (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) as 
where c = −σ
which is handled by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3:
The semi-indefinite constraints in (72) can be replaced by the following LMI constraint:
. . , K, and {s ′′(k) ≥ 0} denote the auxiliary variables.
Proof: See Appendix F. 
where H (k) and F (k) are recursively given by
,
in which
. . , K, and {s (k) ≥ 0} denote the auxiliary variables.
Proof: It is observed that (68c) differs from (44a) in the only respect that σ Last, by replacing "ηP s " in (44c) with "τ ηP s " in (68e), (68e) can be replaced by a similar LMI as (67), denoted by (68e ′ ), in which the pertinent auxiliary variables are denoted by {µ k }.
As a result, the equivalent reformulation for problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) can be summarized as (73), (75), (68e ′ ), (68d), (68f),
is convex and can be solved efficiently by convex optimization tools such as CVX. Next, we derive the Lagrangian of (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR). Note that in the following expression, we only consider the uncertainties regardingh 0 , h k 's,h k 's, g 0 and g k 's when K = 1 for the purpose of simplicity and the results can be easily extended to the case of K > 1. Denote the dual variables associated with (68d), (70), (73), (75) and (68e ′ ) by β 0 , W , V , Y and H 1 , respectively. Then the partial Lagrangian of (P2
where Ω is the set of all primal and dual variables, and
2,2 are the ith entry of the block diagonalsubmatrices
is a unit-norm vector orthogonal toΞ (c.f. (28)).
2) According to (80), if rank(X * ) > 1, i.e., there exists at least oneā n > 0, we reconstruct a solution to problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) usinĝ
while {Q * k } are obtained by solving the following feasibility problem provided thatX * ,δ * , andτ * are given by (81), (82) and (83), respectively:
Proof: See Appendix G. The scheme that solves (P2 ′ ) is summarized in Table II. TABLE II Algorithm II for (P2 ′ )
• Initializeγ ′ e search = 0 : α ′ :γ ′ e max and i = 0
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we provide numerical examples to validate our results. We assume a typical scenario where the K helpers are evenly distributed around Alice with a radius of ρ k = 2m and θ k = 2π(k−1) K (radian by default), where θ k is the angle of direction (w.r.t. the Alice-relay link by default) of the kth helper, k = 1, . . . , K. Alice, Bob and Eve are, w.l.o.g., assumed to have the same distance away from the AF relay with their angle of direction 0, π/6 and 11π/6, respectively. We also assume channel models with both large-scale fading, i.e., path loss and shadowing, and small-scale fading, i.e., multi-path fading. The simplified large-scale fading model is given by [38] 
where z is a log-normal random variable capturing the effect of shadowing with the standard derivation σ = 8dB [39] ,
0 is a reference distance set to be 1m, and α = 3 is the path loss exponent. Specifically, the channels between Alice and each individual helper, H k , and those to/from the AF relay, i.e., h 0 ,h 0 and g 0 , are assumed to suffer from Rician fading while the channels from the HJ helpers to Bob and Eve follow Rayleigh distribution due to the missing of ling-of-sight (LOS) components with their respective average gain specified by (84). Take h k , ∀k, as an example, (84)),ȟ k is the Rayleigh fading component denoted byȟ k ∼ CN (0, DI), and K R is the Rician factor set to be 3. Note that for the involved LOS component, we use the far-field uniform linear antenna array to model the channels [40] . In addition, K is set to be 5; the AF relay is assumed to be 10m away from Alice; the EH efficiency, η = 0.5 and σ 
A. The Perfect CSI Case
We compare the proposed optimal solutions with two suboptimal schemes in the case of perfect CSI. One suboptimal scheme, denoted by "Suboptimal 1", is introduced in Section III-C1 by exploiting the optimal structure of W . Another is known as ZF, denoted by "Suboptimal 2". Specifically, each jamming beam n k is restricted to lie in the orthogonal space ofh † k , such that n k 's cause no interference to the IR. First, we study the secrecy rate at the receiver versus the transmit power of the transmitter, P s with P r = 0dBm. Fig. 2 demonstrates that for both cases of N t = 3 and N t = 5, the average secrecy rate increases and tends to be saturated as P s becomes larger. It also illustrates that "suboptimal 1" and "suboptimal 2" closely approach the optimal solutions. Moreover, with N t increasing, the average secrecy rate gets larger as a result of the higher array gain of the AF relay and more available power for jamming at the HJ helpers.
In addition, we show in Fig. 3 the secrecy rate achieved by different schemes versus the transmit power of the AF relay, P r with P s = 10dBm. It is seen that the average secrecy rate first grows faster and then slower, since when P r increases, not only the desired signal but also the noise yielded form the first transmission phase is amplified to a larger extent. In addition, the performance gap between the optimal scheme and two suboptimal ones is almost negligible.
B. The Imperfect CSI Case
Now, we consider the imperfect CSI case and compare the proposed scheme Robust SDR with HJ, which is obtained by solving (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-sub), against some benchmarks. Note that there are two upper-bound benchmark schemes, namely, Robust SDR with HJ and Robust-eqv with HJ, as well as two lower-bound benchmarks, which are Robust w/o HJ and Non-robust with HJ. For Robust SDR with HJ (Robusteqv with HJ), given anyγ e ,Ĥ(γ e ) is approximated by solving the rank constraint relaxed problem (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) ((P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR-Eqv)). On the other hand, for Robust w/o HJ, we solve (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR) by setting Q k = 0, ∀k while for Non-robust with HJ, (11) is evaluated by applying the optimal solutions to (P1 ′ .1) assuming perfect CSI, to the actual channels including errors that are picked up from the sets defined in (41) .
To assess the worst-case secrecy performance, we use the metric, namely, secrecy outage probability, defined as [41] :
where r * 0 obtained by solving (P2 ′ ) is termed as the 100p%-secrecy outage rate.
The parameters are set identical to those in the perfect CSI case. Regarding the uncertainty model in (41), we introduce the uncertainty ratios associated with ǫ 0 , ǫ
k are similarly defined and thus omitted here for brevity. Besides, it is reasonable to assume that the channel estimates w.r.t Eve suffer from more errors than those for Alice and Bob. Hence, we set α
while α 2 0 = α 2 k = 5% unless otherwise specified. Fig. 4 demonstrates the cumulative density function (CDF) of the achievable secrecy rate from 1000 samples of channel error uniformly generated by (41) given fixed actual channels. We set P r = 0dBm, P s = 10dBm, N t = 3 and K = 5. Despite being suboptimal to the upper-bound schemes "Robust SDR with HJ" and "Robust-eqv with HJ", the proposed "Robust with HJ" scheme outperforms its non-robust counterpart "Non-robust with HJ" given the same estimated channels, and is apparently superior than the "Robust w/o HJ". For example, the "Robust with HJ" can achieve a secrecy rate of 3.4bps/Hz in the worst case versus that of 2.65bps/Hz and 0.8bps/Hz for the "Non-robust with HJ" and "Robust w/o HJ", respectively. The solutions for "Robust SDR with HJ" also admit very little gap to those for "Robust-eqv with HJ". different number of HJ helpers from 1000 different channel realizations, with P r = 0dBm, P s = 10dBm and N t = 3. It is observed that proposed solutions of "Robust with HJ" nearly achieve their upper-bound rank constraint relaxed solutions of "Robust upper SDR with HJ" throughout the whole range of outage probability. Moreover, the "Robust w/o HJ" scheme yields the worst performance. In particular, when the outage probability falls to 3% where the "Robust w/o HJ" achieves a worst-case secrecy rate almost touching zero, the proposed scheme can still guarantee an outage rate of rough 1.3bps/Hz. Also, we note that increasing the number of HJ helpers will improve the secrecy rate but to a limited extent, since more helpers for jamming may introduce greater interference to the legitimate receiver due to inaccurate channel estimations. A negligible gap between "Robust SDR with HJ " and "Robusteqv with HJ" is also observed, which suggests that approximatingĤ(γ e ) by solving the complexity reduced "Robust SDR with HJ " leads almost no performance loss. Fig. 6 shows two different levels of secrecy outage capacity versus the channel uncertainty ratios (assuming α 0 = α k , ∀k), in which P r = 10dBm, P s = 10dBm, N t = 3 and K = 5. It is observed that the secrecy outage rate decreases with the eavesdropper's CSI error's level, even more drastically for higher secrecy outage requirement, which validates the motivation of the worst-case robust optimization. It is worth noting that the advantage of the HJ protocol is more significant when the normalized channel uncertainty falls below 3%, since the HJ scheme provides more degree of freedom for robust design and thus guarantees larger worst-case secrecy rate. The reasonably suboptimal performance of the proposed "Robust with HJ" in contrast with its upper-bound solutions is also seen as from Figs. 4 and 5. Fig. 7 studies the 100p%-secrecy outage rate for p = 10 and p = 20, respectively, versus the transmit power of the AF relay. Specifically, we set P s = 10dBm, N t = 3, K = 5 and α 0 = α k = 2%, ∀k. As observed similarly from Fig. 6 , the robust scheme with the assistance of HJ helpers performs considerably better than solutions without the HJ helpers. In addition, "Robust SDR with HJ" is seen to strike a good trade off between its optimality and complexity in approximatinĝ H(γ e ) compared with the "Robust-eqv with HJ" scheme. 
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper considered improving the secret wireless communications in a multi-antenna AF relay wiretap channel via a novel harvest-and-jam (HJ) relaying protocol. The artificial noise (AN) covariance matrices and the amplify-and-forward (AF) relay weight matrix have been jointly optimized to maximize the achievable (worst-case) secrecy rate at the legitimate receiver subject to the transmit power constraints of the AF relay as well as the jamming helpers, on both perfect and imperfect CSI occasions, using the technique of semi-definite relaxation (SDR). Meanwhile, rank-one reconstruction algorithms were proposed achieving promising tradeoffs between complexity and performance.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
The KKT conditions of (P1 ′ .1-RW-SDR) are given by
According to (26) , if for certain k, β *
However, rank(Q * k ) cannot be 0, since otherwise tr(Q * k ) − τ * ηP s h k 2 < 0 and thus β * k = 0 according to (87c), which contradicts to β * k > 0. Hence, when β *
r Y 2 − β * 0 Φ and according to (25) , we have
Then define r c , Ξ and η n , n = 1, . . . , N 2 t − r c (c.f. (28)). Similar to the approach used in [7, Appendix B], we discuss the structure of the optimal X under two cases.
(1) Case I: r c = N 
It is observed that Z is of the same form as the Hessian matrix with respect to X without rank relaxation. 
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which can be reexpressed as 
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Next, assume that the robust design for (58) has been considered against the precedent k − 1 uncertainties, i.e., (100) 
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Next, devising the method of mathematical induction again as that for (99), (104) holds for g k ∈ G k , ∀k, if and only if there exists {v(k) ≥ 0}, such that (63) is satisfied, which completes the proof.
F. Proof of Proposition 4.3
We only sketch the proof herein since it is quite similar to that of Proposition 4.1. First, apply Lemma 4.2 to (71) givenh k 's, k = 2, . . . , K, fixed and obtain an initial LMI. Next, manipulate the resulting LMI according to the property of Schur-Complements to facilitate using Lemma 4.2. Then, repeat this procedure until all the semi-indefinite constraints w.r.t.h k 's have been incorporated into an equivalent LMI.
G. Proof of Proposition 4.5
According to the KKT conditions of (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR), we haveĀ * X * = 0, whereĀ * is given by (79 
and thus (69a) holds true, which implies that the same optimal value as (P2 ′ .1-RW-SDR), i.e., δ * , is achievable. However, since the constraint in (68c) , and thus suboptimal for (P2 ′ ).
